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I. CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE INFORMATION AGE
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has established a national DNA database.
All states are contributing to it, submitting DNA exemplars from persons sent to
prison or even arrested.1 As the list of database-solved criminal cases grows, one can
expect pressure to broaden the pool of offenders or potential offenders from which
exemplars are taken. With the availability of even faster computers and the
decreasing cost and increasing reliability of DNA testing, it is not too difficult to
imagine a future in which any body scraping or remnant-a hair or body fluid, such as
a smear of sweat-left at a crime scene will be enough to generate a specific name
and address.
DNA advances are just one source of increased crime fighting power in the
information age. Video surveillance cameras are increasingly used in public and
private spaces. They are now common in England and in much of Europe.2 Advances
in facial recognition and photo enhancement technology allow quicker creation and
distribution of more accurate images of suspects. Special software helps criminal
investigators organize information and search it for leads.4 The use of global
positioning satellites makes it possible to track potential and past offenders. 5
Developments in encryption technology allow government to better investigate white
collar offenses in which a computer is used.6 Advances in infrared technology allow
more effective yet undisclosed police searches.' Improved fingerprint technology8
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and the development of new biometric markers-scent and voice prints-increase
investigators' power to identify suspects.9
One can imagine a world, even within a democratic society that values personal
privacy, in which high clearance rates (the rate at which police identify and arrest a
suspect for reported offenses) are the norm and in which the availability of reliable
evidence produces high prosecution and conviction rates-in other words, a world in
which most crimes are solved and most perpetrators caught and punished.
The possibility of such a future suggests it is worth considering this question:
What would criminal law look like in a high-punishment-rate world, and how would it
differ from what it is today?
II. A SKETCH OF THE CURRENT CONFLICTING VIEWS ON THE
PROPER DISTRIBUTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND PUNISHMENT
A standard long-running dispute in criminal law pits those who want to distribute
liability and punishment in the way that most effectively (and efficiently) avoids
future crime (commonly called the "crime control" view) against those who want to
distribute punishment according to the moral desert of the offender (commonly called
the "desert" view).
The primary mechanisms of the crime control view are deterrence and
incapacitation. That is, the view seeks to distribute liability and punishment in a way
that most effectively deters future offenders by threat of punishment, or in a way that
most effectively incapacitates those who are not likely to be deterred.
The crime control view is criticized by desert advocates because distributive
principles of deterrence and incapacitation would impose punishment according to
criteria that desert theorists think unjust. Greater punishment in high-profile cases
makes good deterrence sense-maximizing the deterrent effect of the punishment
dollar-but violates principles of desert because it does not track an offender's degree
of moral blameworthiness. Giving long prison terms to young offenders who commit
minor offenses but who are predicted to offend more seriously in the future makes
good incapacitation sense but again violates desert. (The effects can be the reverse as
well: incapacitation theory might not waste punishment on a serious offense that will
not reoccur, but a desert distribution might insist on it.)
In other words, a crime control distribution is criticized because it either does
injustice or fails to do justice. A desert distribution is criticized because it allows
avoidable crime-those offenses that could have been deterred or that could have
been avoided by incapacitating the dangerous.' °
Crime control principles are also criticized on their own terms: A deterrence
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distributive principle makes little sense, some argue, because manipulation of rules to
maximize deterrence has little chance of having an effect, in large part because the
deterrent threat of the present criminal justice system is so ineffective. The present
criminal justice system is a sieve: many offenses are not reported, often because the
police are seen as impotent to do anything; most reported offenses are not cleared (no
arrest is made); and of those arrested, most are not convicted (and of those convicted,
many are not punished). The end result is a low likelihood of getting punished for an
offense. In rough terns, a person contemplating a rape faces a twelve percent chance
of going to prison for that offense. Robbery presents less than a four percent chance.
Assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft are each a 100-to-I shot. Many
potential offenders will not be deterred by these threats."
An incapacitation principle, in turn, is unwise, some argue, because under present
conditions it would be inefficient and costly, both economically and morally. The
criticism focuses primarily on the high false positive rate of predictions of future
criminality-commonly two of three. Thus, three times as many people must be
incarcerated as actually present a risk. In our present system, that means a staggering
cost of incarceration. And the human cost also is high. When the proportion of
incarcerated persons in any given community reaches a significant level, it can cause
significant social dislocation (as in the District of Columbia, for example, where a
significant proportion of black males in their twenties and thirties are under criminal
justice system control at any given time). At the same time, it is also argued that
using the criminal justice system as a preventive device provides poor social
protection because of the logical constraints inherent in cloaking such preventive
detention as criminal justice.' 2
The crime control picture is considerably more complex than this; I have just
sketched the broad contours of the debate as background.
This continuing struggle between desert and crime control has resulted in a
criminal justice system whose governing principles might be summarized this way:
Desert commonly has more influence than crime control in assigning criminal
liability, but the two share control of sentencing.
But if the information age did bring high clearance and conviction rates, one
might predict that this would all change. Such a world would provide the conditions
for a true and effective deterrent threat. Even a fifty percent likelihood of getting
convicted and punished would make the deterrent threat real. And there is a spill-over
benefit that supports use of the incapacitation mechanism: As more people are
deterred, the population of undeterred people requiring incapacitation grows smaller
and, therefore, the costs of such a program-financial and human-become more
1 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Social Science
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feasible. One might predict, then, that an information age of high punishment rates
would bring the crime control principles to their strong point and have them dominate
desert as the distributive principle.
This is where things get interesting. I think it is possible that just the opposite
may occur: The conditions that make crime control mechanisms finally relevant and
even powerful, also ultimately may render such mechanisms obsolete as distributive
principles. That is, the success of crime control mechanisms may paradoxically lead
to the dominance of desert as a distributive principle.
III. THE PARADOX: CRIME CONTROL SUCCESS PROMOTES THE
DOMINATION OF DESERT?
Why might the success of crime control mechanisms promote the dominance of
desert? First, consider that an increased probability of punishment increases the
deterrent threat of all punishment, even that distributed according to a desert principle.
That is, even a desert system gets the benefit of improved deterrence. A pure
deterrence-based system might deter even more, but the deterrent advantage of such a
system over a desert distribution lies only in its marginal increase in deterrent
effectiveness, which may remain as limited as it is today. To prefer a deterrence
distribution, one must conclude that the additional deterrence coming from those
instances in which deterrence violates desert outweighs the societal interest in
distributing liability and punishment according to desert.
At the same time, a more effective deterrent threat is likely to result in a reduced
public concern about crime generally. The deterrent effectiveness inherent in even a
desert distribution might well be enough to cause crime to fade as the significant
social problem that it is today. It would be easier to justify injustice necessary for
crime control in a world where crime is out of control than in one in which crime is no
longer a serious problem.
Of course, this analysis assumes there is some inherent value in having a desert
distribution. Certainly the retributivists think so. And there also are utilitarian
arguments in support of a desert distribution, as I have sketched elsewhere. 13 But in
this Commentary, I make a prediction about what will happen, not what should. My
grounds for thinking that there will be some natural preference for a desert distribution
comes from social science research that seems to suggests that desert is the "default"
criterion that people naturally prefer in the distribution of criminal liability and
punishment. It is an actor's perceived blameworthiness, as reflected in the extent of
the person's culpability and the harm caused, for example, rather than the prediction
of future harms that might be avoided or the factors relevant to effective deterrence,
that naturally guide people's judgment about how much punishment should be
imposed. 14
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This suggests that people's distributive preferences may be altered by
contemporary conditions. If they feel threatened and embattled, they may think
justice is a luxury they cannot afford. But as punishment rates go up and crime rates
go down, the fading sense of fear may make people feel that justice is a luxury they
can afford again.
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